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Overview 
Next year the first liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier ships will 
dock off Gladstone in Queensland, ready to ship LNG to Asian 
and other markets. By 2017 east coast gas, added to growing 
Western Australian supplies, could create the world’s biggest gas 
export industry, worth $53 billion a year. But this transformation is 
not good news for everyone. 
Strong Asian demand and high prices are inducing Australian 
producers to export their gas. That means local consumers will 
have to pay higher prices. Within the next couple of years, gas 
prices for households on the east coast, particularly in Victoria, 
will rise by as much as $170 a year. Large industrial users of gas 
will come under pressure from equally significant price increases. 
Gas presents other challenges, too. Infrastructure constraints plus 
commercial battles over prices mean there may be difficulties 
getting gas to where it is needed on the east coast, especially in 
New South Wales. And the long-anticipated ‘dash for gas’, in 
which it acts as a transition fuel while electricity generation shifts 
over time from coal to low-carbon technologies, is not happening 
in Australia. Falling demand, rising gas prices and a renewable 
energy target that largely supports new wind energy mean new 
gas-fired electricity generation is unlikely to be required for at 
least the next decade. 
With more than $160 billion forecast to be invested in LNG 
production, the export industry is good for the economy. 
Governments should therefore resist self-interested calls from 
some industries to cap prices or reserve gas for the domestic 
market. Western Australia should go further, and end its policy of 
reserving gas for domestic use. Protectionism may provide some 
short-term price relief for targeted industries, but ultimately it leads 
to higher prices and damages the economy. 
Yet government and industry both have vital roles in ensuring the 
market works efficiently. Governments must: 
• Resolve the coal seam gas impasse in New South Wales. 
• Create a more transparent gas market that includes new 
trading hubs, such as Wallumbilla in Queensland, and a 
gas price index that provides clear information to all 
players.  
• Remove barriers to efficient supply by freeing up trading of 
pipeline capacity, and moving towards elimination of joint 
marketing arrangements as the market matures. 
Industry, for its part, must ensure supply can flow. There is no 
shortage of gas, but infrastructure may be physically unable to 
meet growing demand in the short term. Gas producers must 
respond to the needs of their customers or political pressure will 
push governments to intervene.  
With global gas resources likely to last at least 200 years, the 
International Energy Agency has described the next decade as 
the ‘golden age of gas’. Australia is well placed to reap the 
commercial benefits, but has further to go to create an affordable, 
reliable and sustainable energy sector. 
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1. What does the global gas revolution mean for Australia? 
1.1 Gas markets are on the move 
Around the world, gas markets are changing on an 
unprecedented scale. Demand is surging. Between 1990 and 
2010 gas consumption increased by 63 per cent. By 2020 it is 
forecast to have nearly doubled since 1990.1 
A number of developments are driving demand for gas: 
• Worldwide demand for energy is growing due to rapid 
economic development in China, India, and the Middle East.2 
• Global supplies are growing, and are more than enough to 
meet demand. Increased supply pushes down the price.  
• Several countries have banned or restricted the use of nuclear 
power following the Japanese nuclear disaster in 2011. 
• Concerns about climate change mean that companies and 
nations need to limit emissions of carbon dioxide. Gas power 
plants are usually cheaper than renewable power generators 
such as solar and wind. Gas produces fewer carbon 
emissions than coal and does not have the waste disposal 
problems of nuclear energy. 
                                            
1
 From 76 exajoules to 147 exajoules per year. IEA (2012) 
2
 Ibid. 
Australia has an unparalleled opportunity to exploit its vast gas 
reserves and access to major markets in Japan, Korea, China and 
India. By 2015, Australia is projected to be the world’s second 
largest LNG exporter, after Qatar (see Box 1 for a description of 
LNG).3 By 2017 it may be the largest.4 But what is good news for 
exporters is not necessarily good for local consumers of gas. 
1.2 Supply has rapidly emerged to meet the market 
Current assessments of global gas resources exceed 200 years 
of supply at current levels of production.5 The ‘game-changer’, as 
the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) called 
it, has been the invention of affordable ways to extract shale gas. 
Shale gas is a standard form of gas but is extracted from a 
different type of rock under the earth’s surface. Innovative drilling 
techniques have made it possible to extract this gas at affordable 
prices. There is also a lot of it. 
Figure 1 shows how shale gas production - virtually non-existent a 
decade ago - is projected to dominate US gas production by 
2040. This chart also reflects how new supply was developed to 
meet higher demand and higher prices. The techniques  
                                            
3
 BREE (2012c) 
4
 Bethune (2013) 
5
 IEA (2012) 
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developed in the US have the potential to be applied more widely. 
While producers face challenges to extract gas from new 
locations using these new techniques, supplies have the potential 
to last a long time. 
 
Box 1: What is LNG? What is an LNG train? 
In domestic markets, gas is typically transported through 
pipelines. But when gas needs to be transported overseas it may 
not be technically viable or economically attractive to build a 
pipeline. In this case, gas must be transported by ship. 
Liquefied natural gas or LNG is produced because it is more 
efficient to transport than natural gas. The LNG is created by 
passing gas through a system called an LNG train, which cools 
and compresses the gas, then loads it onto a ship for transport.  
When LNG arrives at its destination, it is regasified – turned back 
into gas - and then delivered to end users through domestic 
pipelines. Converting gas to LNG, transporting it and regasifying it 
on arrival is expensive. To liquefy and ship it from Australia to 
Asia may cost $5 to $6 a gigajoule, more than the cost of gas in 
many Australian markets today. 
 
Coal seam gas and shale gas are often grouped under the 
heading ‘unconventional gas’ as described in Box 2. 
Figure 1: US natural gas prices and production, 1990 to 2040 
 
Source:  EIA (2012); EIA (2013b); EIA (2013a) 
As shown in Table 1, Australia’s ‘proven and probable’ reserves of 
coal seam gas and conventional gas are around 
140,000 petajoules, enough to meet more than 70 years of gas 
demand at current rates of production. 6 The potential in-ground 
resource of coal seam and shale gas could be four times as large 
as known reserves.7 A recent report for the Australian Council of 
Learned Academies describes the shale potential in Australia, 
                                            
6
 EnergyQuest (2012) cited in AER (2012) 
7
 BREE (2012c) 
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whilst also indicating that it may not be as readily realised as it 
has been in the USA.8 
Table 1: Australia’s ‘proven and probable’ gas reserves and 
production, 2012 
Market Type Reserves 
(petajoules) 
Production 
(petajoules) 
Western Australia Conventional  89,900 1,193 
Northern Territory Conventional  1,300 33 
East Coast Conventional  7,100 453 
East Coast Coal seam gas 41,700 247 
 Total  140,000 1,924 
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. 
Production includes both domestic sales and exports. 
Source: EnergyQuest (2012), as cited in AER (2012) 
1.3 Rising demand expands the Australian industry   
High gas prices in Asia, as shown in Figure 2, have supported 
enormous investment in infrastructure in Australia, despite its high 
construction costs relative to other countries. 
On the east coast, $50 billion has been committed to developing 
LNG export facilities based on coal seam gas in Queensland. In 
Western Australia, over $116 billion is being spent on projects 
under construction to expand the LNG export industry. Figure 3 
shows forecast demand for east coast gas over the next two 
decades. 
                                            
8
 Australian Council of Learned Academies (2013) 
Figure 2: Global gas prices for key regions 
 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
This investment of over $160 billion will pay for the 13 new LNG 
trains currently under construction on Australia’s east and west 
coasts. A further 19 trains are in the planning stage for possible 
development. The LNG industry is set to become a driving force 
for jobs and growth in the economy over the next decade and 
beyond. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
US$ per gigajoule
Europe
Japan
USA
Getting gas right: Australia’s energy challenge 
Grattan Institute 2013 7 
Box 2: What is 'unconventional' gas? 
Imagine trying to get all of the air out of a hollow chocolate 
Easter egg. Now, imagine trying to get the air out of a chocolate 
Aero bar, where it is trapped in small bubbles between the 
chocolate. The analogy illustrates the differences between 
extracting gas from conventional and from unconventional gas 
reservoirs. 
‘Conventional’ gas is extracted from a large underground 
chamber - like an Easter egg. The gas filters upwards through 
layers of porous sandstone deep in the earth’s crust until it is 
trapped under a dense layer of ‘impermeable’ rock. To extract 
the gas, a hole is drilled to the highest point in the reservoir and 
gas, which is lighter than air, flows to the surface. 
Unconventional gas, like the air in an Aero bar, is not found in a 
continuous underground chamber. To encourage gas to flow 
from an unconventional well, producers sometimes inject fluid 
into the gas reservoir to fracture the rock and encourage gas 
flow. This technique is called hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’. 
Its critics say that fracturing the rock may allow gas or 
chemicals to enter ground water supplies. 
Unconventional gas supplies fall into several categories. 
Coal seam gas (CSG) is extracted from coal deposits. The gas 
is released by extracting water from around the coal deposit. 
Removing the water reduces pressure and releases the gas. 
 
Shale gas and tight gas are extracted from layers of rock 
with low permeability (small gas bubbles), which prevents 
gas collecting in a reservoir. Shale gas is found in 
sedimentary rocks such as sandstone. Tight gas is found in 
denser types of rock. 
Australia is a world leader in coal seam gas technology and 
production but development of shale and tight gas 
resources remain in their infancy. 
Conventional and unconventional gas wells both produce 
the same product – methane or ‘natural gas’. 
 
Source: Grattan analysis 
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Figure 3: Forecast gas demand for eastern and Western Australia, 
2010 to 2030 
Source: AEMO (2012a); ACIL Tasman (2011); Government of Western Australia (2012a) 
The domestic gas industry will also gain from production 
economies of scale, which bring down the cost of extracting 
unconventional gas such as coal seam or shale gas. Australian 
markets are also unlikely to suffer the fate of US markets, where 
gas users faced several years of shortages and high prices before 
producers made breakthroughs in developing unconventional gas. 
In Australia, export opportunities are driving these breakthroughs. 
Yet this good news for the Australian economy also carries a 
price. 
1.4 The price of going global 
Until now, Australia’s east coast gas market and the global gas 
market have been physically disconnected. As such, there has 
been no way for gas sellers to move gas from lower-priced 
domestic markets to higher-priced international markets. This has 
allowed different gas prices to develop in each market. From next 
year, LNG exports will commence from the east coast and the two 
markets will be connected for the first time. That will bring their 
prices together, and lift prices at home. Sellers, attracted by 
higher prices, will move supply from the cheaper to the more 
expensive market until prices converge. 
At present, Japanese buyers are prepared to pay about $15 a 
gigajoule. While Australian gas prices are forecast to rise, it is 
highly unlikely that domestic gas prices will rise to the same level 
as the prices seen in Japan. The gas price in importing countries 
includes the cost for converting gas to LNG, transporting it by ship 
and converting back to gas on arrival. The process is expensive – 
in the range of $5 to $6 a gigajoule to send gas from Australia to 
Japan. This cost differential provides an advantage for businesses 
buying gas in a country with gas reserves relative to competitors 
in countries that have to import their gas. 
This ‘export parity’ price is therefore setting the benchmark for 
new gas contract negotiations in Australia. Because east coast 
gas prices have not been exposed to international markets, 
domestic wholesale contract prices have been both stable and 
low by international standards - about $3 to $4 a gigajoule.9 
Underlying low costs of production plus the need to compete with 
                                            
9
 AER (2012) 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030
Petajoules per year
East Coast
Export
West Coast 
Domestic 
West Coast
Export
East Coast 
Domestic 
Getting gas right: Australia’s energy challenge 
Grattan Institute 2013 9 
coal and oil for electricity and industry have also kept prices low. 
But when exports start, prices are likely to rise. At the same time, 
the production cost of new gas sources is also expected to rise. 
In Western Australia, which already exports LNG in large 
volumes, prices are around $5.40 a gigajoule.  
Over the next several years, wholesale domestic gas price 
increases of more than 80 per cent nationally can be expected. 
Table 2 shows ‘base case’ gas price forecasts from a number of 
analysts of Australia’s east and west coast markets.  
Table 2: Analysts’ gas price forecasts for the east and west coasts 
of Australia (real $ a gigajoule, $2012-13) 
Source Forecast 
year 
Eastern Market Western Market 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
ACIL Tasman 2010 6.6 7.9 8.0 8.4 
ACIL Tasman 2011 7.9 10.6 - - 
ACIL Tasman 2012 8.6 11.7 13.4 11.8 
AEMO/IES 2011 7.0 8.3 - - 
Australian Treasury 
(ROAM) 
2011 - 10.1 - 10.1 
Australian Treasury 
(SKM-MMA) 
2011 6.2 9.3 6.2 9.3 
 Average  7.3 9.6 9.2 9.9 
Notes:  Where necessary, data adjusted using CPI to Dec 2012 
Sources: AER (2012); BREE (2012c); BREE (2012b); ACIL Tasman (2012); AEMO (2011); 
ROAM Consulting (2011); SKM MMA (2011) 
We have used the average of the above forecasts to estimate the 
impact of such price rises. While this table shows price increases 
that may be expected by 2020, the transition to higher prices may 
not be gradual. It is possible that prices will rise sharply over the 
next few years as exports commence on the east coast and are 
expanded on the west, then increase only moderately before 
2020. 
The expected price increases will follow major increases in 
electricity prices over the last several years. They will be felt most 
acutely by residential customers and some parts of the 
manufacturing industry.  
1.4.1 Gas use in Australia 
Gas is a major source of energy in Australia. Gas provided 20 per 
cent of all final energy consumption in the Australian economy in 
2010-11, with the balance coming from oil (52 per cent), electricity 
(21 per cent), coal (4 per cent) and renewable energy (4 per 
cent).10 
A third of the gas used in the domestic economy is used for 
supplying electricity, as shown in Figure 4. Another sixth is used 
in other energy transformations, where gas is used to refine other 
fuels, such as coal or petroleum. This is one of the reasons why 
the significant role of gas in the Australian economy is not always 
obvious – for every gigajoule consumed directly by an end-user, 
an equivalent amount of gas has been used to help produce some 
other type of energy. 
                                            
10
 BREE (2012a) 
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Figure 4: Share of gas consumption by use and state in 2010-11 
 
Source: BREE (2012a) 
1.5.1 Household gas use 
Households use around 150 petajoules of gas a year, or 10 per 
cent of Australia’s gas consumption. Victorians use more than 
100 petajoules – two thirds of the national household total.11 
Across the country, people are worried about the rising cost of 
household energy bills after rapid increases in electricity and gas 
prices in recent years. Victorians are particularly exposed to the 
impact of rising gas prices. 
Figure 5 shows how household gas expenditure varies among 
Australian states. Victoria’s extensive pipeline network makes gas 
available to most metropolitan households. Its relatively cold 
winters also increase household demand for gas for heating. 
                                            
11
 Ibid. 
Figure 5: Average household gas bills by state, $2012-13 
 
Notes: Assumes volumes remain at 2009-10 levels in 2020. New South Wales values 
include data for the Australian Capital Territory. 
Sources: ABS (2011b); ABS (2011a); ACIL Tasman (2010); AER (2012); BREE (2012a) 
Across Australia, households are likely to pay an extra 
$544 million a year in retail gas bills in the next few years. In 
Victoria, the cost increases will be most acute. Our analysis, 
illustrated in Figure 6, suggests that higher wholesale costs will 
put around $170 extra onto the annual gas bill of the average 
Victorian gas customer. 
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Figure 6: Potential annual increase in household gas cost, 2009-10 
to 2020, $2012-13
 
Note: Assumes volumes remain at 2009-10 levels in 2020. 
Sources: ABS (2011b); ABS (2011a); ACIL Tasman (2010); AER (2012); BREE (2012a) 
1.4.2 Industrial gas use 
In 2010-11, a little over 1500 petajoules of gas were used in the 
Australian economy. 12 Removing the gas used by households 
and for electricity supply, around 860 petajoules were used for 
industry or in industrial energy transformations; 57 per cent of all 
gas used in Australia. Assuming no change in levels of gas use, 
                                            
12
 BREE (2012a) Table F 
our analysis suggests that rising gas prices could cost industrial 
users up to $3.2 billion a year. It is likely that industrial users 
would take steps to reduce their gas use in response to higher 
prices, so the actual impact to industry could be substantially 
lower. 
Figure 7: Annual energy use by industry sector: all consumption, 
less residential use and electricity supply, 2010-11 
 
Source: BREE (2012a) 
As Figure 7 shows, this cost will not be distributed evenly across 
the economy. A large portion of gas consumed in Australia is 
used by a relatively small number of gas-intensive industries, 
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mostly in manufacturing. In several industries – including fertiliser, 
petrochemical, aluminium, cement and brick manufacturing – gas 
is a material cost. 
Similarly, the cost will not be distributed evenly by state. As shown 
in Figure 8, over half of the total cost increases to industrial users, 
a total of almost $1.8 billion, could be borne in Western Australia. 
Figure 8: Potential effect of higher wholesale prices on industry by 
state, all consumption, excluding electricity supply and 
households, $2012-13 
 
Note: Assumes volumes remain at 2010-11 levels in 2020. 
Source: ACIL Tasman (2010); AER (2012); BREE (2012a) 
Groups representing affected companies maintain that higher gas 
prices pose a major threat to Australian manufacturing, already 
under pressure from high labour costs and a high exchange 
rate.13 
The Australian Industry Group, an industry association, recently 
surveyed gas users in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland 
and South Australia on their experiences of obtaining gas 
contracts in the current market. Of 62 respondents to the survey, 
the average price for existing gas contracts was around $4.80 a 
gigajoule. 
Of the 29 respondents who were seeking to renew or add to 
existing gas contracts, all of those who were offered contracts 
received offers at prices above the current average, as shown in 
Figure 9. Of particular note, customers who wanted longer 
contracts (more than two years) or contracts commencing after 
2013 were quoted an average price of $8.70 a gigajoule - much 
higher than the average price of $5.10 a gigajoule for short term 
contracts (less than two years) from 2013. 
To some extent, the higher price for gas contracts beyond 2015 
reflects the broader state of the gas market. Facing high levels of 
uncertainty about future prices, suppliers may be reluctant to sign 
long term contracts. If buyers want to lock in their gas costs, they 
will have to pay high prices. However, this does not make matters 
easier for buyers, who may be forced to accept higher gas prices, 
less certainty around their future fuel costs, or both. 
                                            
13
 AIG (2013b) 
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Figure 9: Gas prices offered for new contracts, 2013 
 
Source: AIG (2013a) 
Higher gas prices will have a negative impact on some industrial 
users. The fact that significant price increases simply reveal the 
working of efficient markets will not make the pain any easier.  
There is evidence to suggest that companies are already passing 
costs on to customers. Brickworks, a clay and concrete products 
manufacturer that operates nationally, maintains that the effect of 
higher gas prices on brick prices has raised the cost of a new 
house in Perth by $1352.14 
In some cases, companies with options to source cheap gas in 
other locations may move operations outside Australia. Incitec 
Pivot notes in its 2012 annual report that “comparing potential 
projects in Australia and the United States a significant difference 
lies in the price of our major raw material, gas.”15 
The government should resist pressure from particular user 
groups urging it to intervene in the market. Australia has far more 
to gain than to lose from the global gas revolution. Nevertheless, 
both government and industry should take measures to ensure 
the market works effectively. Chapter 2 sets out in detail what 
these measures are. 
1.5 The medium-term price outlook is uncertain 
Gas prices in the USA have started to rise modestly after an 
extended period of low prices (see Box 3). Prices at the Henry 
Hub, the price point for gas futures contracts traded on the New 
York Mercantile Exchange, have recently risen from record lows 
of $2 a gigajoule to $4, and there are forecasts that they could 
rise to $6 by 2020.16 If the US Government were to lift restrictions 
on gas exports to countries without free trade agreements with the 
USA, as recent decisions suggest that it might, the current 
domestic price of $4 would translate into prices of $10 to $11 in  
                                            
14
 Roberts (2013) 
15
 Incitec Pivot (2012) 
16
 PIRA (2013) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Average Price
(2 years or less, from 2013)
Average Price
(all others)
$ per gigajoule 
Average of 
existing
contracts
Getting gas right: Australia’s energy challenge 
Grattan Institute 2013 14 
                                            
17
 EIA (2013a) 
18
 John Williams Scientific Services (2012) 
19
 EIA (2012) 
20
 Dicolo (2013) 
21
 Philips (2012) 
22
 Spectator (2013) 
Japan, well below recent contracted prices of more than $15 a 
gigajoule. 
The impact of US exports would be downward pressure on Asian 
prices, and therefore prices in Australia. This would also tend to 
be the case if Japan restarts a significant number of its nuclear 
power stations or if other countries in the region, such as China, 
were to develop a local shale gas industry. There is also potential 
for shale gas development in Australia, 23 although, again, the 
economics are speculative. The recent decision of KOGAS, a 
Korean gas firm, to withdraw from negotiations with Chevron to 
buy gas from the Gorgon project in Western Australia indicates 
that the company believes lower-priced supplies of gas may soon 
become available.24 
The outlook for international gas prices is highly uncertain. Even 
so, depending on contractual arrangements, this should not 
adversely impact the long-term contracts underpinning committed 
LNG infrastructure in Queensland. However, there is much less 
certainty for proposed LNG projects on both sides of the 
Australian continent where contracts for the sale of LNG have yet 
to be negotiated, and for domestic gas prices in the medium-term, 
that is, beyond the next three to five years. 
 
                                            
23
 Australian Council of Learned Academies (2013) 
24
 Klinger (2013) 
Box 3: Cheap gas in the USA 
Figure 2 shows how gas prices in Japan, Europe and the USA 
have diverged in recent years. So, why have US gas prices 
been so low compared with prices in other parts of the world? 
The first explanation is that many US shale gas wells also 
produce liquid hydrocarbons, or ‘liquids’, which are found in 
some natural gas wells and extracted when the gas is 
processed.17 The liquids can substantially improve the 
economics of a gas well, so producers are willing to sell the 
gas at low prices. Many US shale gas fields have high liquids 
content, whereas coal seam gas fields have almost none.18 
Further, US gas markets have developed differently to 
Australian markets. Unconventional gas supplies in the US 
were developed mainly for the domestic gas market, which 
used over 25,000 petajoules of gas in 2012.19 Barriers to gas 
exports have helped to keep supplies high and prices low. It 
has also been argued that US gas prices have been driven to 
unsustainably low levels as the result of a supply glut.20 
These forces have combined to create a market where “gas is 
so cheap that it’s no longer profitable to drill”.21 Further, the 
US Government has begun to lift export barriers.22 It seems 
inevitable that US gas prices must rise in future to more 
sustainable levels. 
Getting gas right: Australia’s energy challenge 
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2. How should government and industry respond?
2.1 Governments should not revert to protectionism 
The prospect of rising gas prices has prompted some 
manufacturers to urge Australian governments to impose price 
controls on gas, to restrict LNG exports, or to force LNG 
producers in eastern Australia to commit a portion of their gas to 
domestic users, as already happens in Western Australia.  
Imposing a requirement that producers must reserve a fixed 
volume or proportion of gas for domestic manufacturing 
consumers is a form of industry protection. The economic benefit 
of the gas resources is shifted from producers to particular 
industry consumers. This redistribution “would be achieved at a 
net cost to the Australian community”, according to the Bureau of 
Resources and Energy Economics.25 More bluntly, economics 
professor Stephen King has described such a reservation scheme 
as “blatant, inefficient and inequitable”.26  
Chapter 4 contains a more comprehensive assessment of 
reservation policies as applied in Western Australia. 
Recent public commentary has asserted that Australian 
governments have failed to extract the best value from the 
resources boom. 27 Yet it is important to separate the question of 
whether taxes on gas producers should rise - a valid question for 
                                            
25
 BREE (2012c) 
26
 King (2013) 
27
 eg Warwick McKibbin in Kehoe (2013)  
government - from whether any kind of tax on producers should 
be used to subsidise domestic manufacturing.  
Three specific reasons why trade protections are not warranted 
for the Australian gas industry are outlined below. 
There is no market failure 
Many arguments for domestic gas reservation or quotas assume 
that markets have ‘failed’ in some way and that governments 
should therefore intervene. 
While some industry claims about the economic effects of higher 
gas prices appear to be exaggerated (see Box 4), the emerging 
gas market and expected rising prices will prove challenging for 
some gas users. High demand for gas has shifted the balance of 
market power towards the gas producers and away from the 
wholesalers and large industrial gas users who buy gas from 
them. If buyers are unwilling to pay higher prices to sign long-term 
contracts, they may have to sign shorter contracts and accept the 
risk that prices will move in coming years. 
Yet, these conditions reflect the dynamics of the underlying 
market; not a market failure. Our analysis found limited evidence 
that gas will not be available to users who are willing to accept 
higher prices and be flexible with contract terms. In the absence 
of a genuine market failure, it is in the interests of the Australian 
economy to allow gas to flow to the users that value it most highly. 
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Box 4: 'Multipliers' and dodgy economics 
Higher gas prices will disadvantage a small number of 
Australian industries that use large amounts of gas as a 
production input or fuel source. High prices could lead some 
manufacturing facilities to close, causing some job losses. 
However, some in the manufacturing sector have greatly 
exaggerated the size and impact of these losses. 
Dow Chemical is a large industrial gas user. In an opinion piece 
for The Australian newspaper, Dow’s CEO called for policy 
intervention in the gas market to ensure natural gas prices that 
are “affordable and stable”. He wrote: 
“Transformed through the manufacturing process, 
natural gas actually creates eight times more value for 
the economy than when it is burned or exported.”28 
The “eight times” multiple ascribed to the manufacturing sector 
is called a ‘multiplier’. Multipliers are calculated by assuming 
that all industries in the economy are related to all other 
industries. It is assumed that an increase in production in one 
sector will have calculable ‘flow on’ effects to other sectors. 
Unfortunately, the argument is deeply flawed. 
This type of analysis makes the extreme assumption that no 
worker would find another job if a manufacturing facility closed.  
 
It also assumes that production inputs would not be put to other 
uses, which is clearly not the case – gas is clearly in demand 
from other sections of the economy and this is why prices are 
increasing. Further, multipliers assume that policy makers have 
no ability to influence employment and economic activity 
through fiscal and monetary policy settings. 
None of these assumed conditions would hold, except under 
extreme conditions that are not relevant to the current Australian 
context. 
Multipliers also suffer from ‘double counting’ as each industry 
implicitly takes credit for growth in other sectors of the economy. 
As Richard Denniss of The Australia Institute noted: 
“…if there were 10 million people in the Australian 
workforce and each industry sought to estimate their 
direct and indirect contribution to employment then 
collectively their claims would add up to 18.7 million 
workers.”29 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics stopped publishing data on 
economic multipliers in 2001-02 because: 
“There was considerable debate ... as to their suitability 
for the purposes to which they were most commonly 
applied, that is, … to support bids for industry assistance 
of various forms.”30 
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Potential effects on LNG investment 
Large investments in LNG have been committed on the basis of 
existing government policies. Any changes to these policies 
should be considered in light of the potential impact they may 
have on Australia’s attractiveness as an investment destination. 
Changes applied retrospectively to committed LNG projects would 
damage Australia’s chances of securing future investment. 
Western Australia gas reservation quotas were negotiated before 
LNG proponents committed to investments. Proponents who have 
argued for an east coast gas reservation frequently fail to 
acknowledge that policy implemented at this late stage of project 
development could significantly damage investors’ confidence in 
the stability of Australian regulatory arrangements, and could 
deter investment.31 A reservation policy applying only to future 
projects would be less damaging, but would be unlikely to relieve 
pressure on markets during the crucial transition period.  
Protectionism will not work 
Reflecting in 2009 on Australia’s experience with trade protection 
in the mid-1980s, the Productivity Commission noted that: 
“large parts of the economy were inefficient, inward 
looking and inflexible. … Australia was not well placed to 
respond to the changes and challenges arising from rapid 
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technological change, global integration and fiercer 
competition from abroad.”32 
Overwhelmingly, Australian and international experiences of trying 
to protect domestic industries by restricting trade have damaged 
the broader economy. 
Trade barriers reduce productivity and blunt companies’ 
incentives to innovate. Protecting some industries from 
international prices prevents economies from shifting investment 
and labour to firms or industries that are more competitive. 
Protectionism also encourages firms to direct resources into 
lobbying governments, at the expense of more productive 
investments.  
Evidence supports the view that trade protections make domestic 
industries less efficient: 
• A recent World Bank study suggested that liberalising trade 
protections boosted per capita GDP growth by between 
1.2 and 2.6 per cent.33  
• A European Bank of Reconstruction and Development study 
showed that, as a result of a domestic quota on wheat sales in 
2010-11, foreign investors held back €550 million of capital to 
avoid the risk of further intervention.34  
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Evidence suggests that while there may be benefit in protecting 
some infant industries,35 such industries rarely receive assistance.  
Rather, large, established industries that can exert pressure on 
government are the ones that are helped.36 
Further, there is no clear evidence that the gas reservation policy 
applied in Western Australia has delivered low gas prices for gas 
users. Western Australian gas prices are currently higher than 
those on the east coast. It is expected that in 2020, after the east 
coast gas market has been exposed to several years of gas 
exports, east coast gas prices will remain lower than west coast 
prices (see Table 2). 
Explicit reservation policies are not the only form of industry 
protection that has or could be proposed by lobby groups 
concerned about rising process. For example, some industry 
groups and companies have argued for a ‘national interest’ or 
‘public interest’ test.37 This would impose an additional hurdle 
requirement on future LNG projects seeking regulatory approvals.  
However, evidence suggests that such policies do not achieve 
favourable economic outcomes. 
In late 2012, the US Department of Energy commissioned NERA 
Economic Consulting to conduct an independent study of how US 
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LNG exports could affect the public interest.38 This study 
examined 13 separate scenarios, varying the outlook for the US 
gas supply and making a range of assumptions about gas export 
restrictions. In every scenario, NERA forecast that the USA would 
receive an economic gain from allowing LNG exports. Further, 
scenarios with unlimited exports always had higher net economic 
benefits than corresponding cases with limited exports.39 
This suggests that there is little to be practically gained from 
imposing ‘public interest’ or ‘national interest’ tests for LNG export 
projects. Rather, such tests have the potential to impose a 
regulatory burden on developers and provide a platform for future 
lobbying by user groups. 
Nevertheless, there are important actions governments should 
take to ensure the market works well. 
2.2 Resolving the coal seam gas impasse in New South 
Wales 
Companies40 and government agencies41 are both concerned that 
New South Wales could face a gas supply shortage between 
2015 and 2017. There is no shortage of gas in the ground, but 
there are concerns about thet ability to get it to the New South 
Wales market on a peak day for gas demand. 
Although New South Wales reserves are only a tenth of those in 
Queensland, gaining access to them could be critical if gas from 
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the Cooper Basin is diverted to Gladstone and the pipelines from 
Victoria are insufficient to consistently meet New South Wales 
demand. Yet the concerns of farmers, landowners and 
environmentalists have led the government to restrict 
development of coal seam gas, which makes up all of the gas 
reserves in New South Wales. 
Amid the claims and counter-claims that have accompanied these 
developments, industrial customers seeking secure supplies for 
five years or more are reporting that they cannot get contracts on 
the east coast “at any price”.42 In a recent Australian Industry 
Group survey of 31 industrial gas users seeking to renew or add 
to gas contracts, 10 per cent of respondents reported that they 
could not obtain a quote and 32 per cent indicated they could not 
obtain a quote at a price considered acceptable.43 Companies 
such as Dow Chemicals and industry associations such as the 
Plastics & Chemicals Industry Association have called for a range 
of measures to ensure supply. 44 These include extended 
reservation of gas for domestic users, a moratorium on LNG 
exports, rebates for ‘transformational industries’, and greater 
market transparency. 
But Australia has enough gas to solve this problem. New South 
Wales gas demand could be met by ramping up coal seam gas 
production to reduce drawing on conventional gas supplies, by 
increasing production from the Cooper Basin or by increasing the 
capacity of gas pipelines from Victoria to New South Wales.  
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With such options available, producers have suggested that 
concerns about a shortfall are commercial posturing. They say 
they are as willing as ever to write gas contracts,45 but that 
customers are not prepared to make long-term commitments to 
underpin supply contracts. The truth is not clear but the tension is 
high. Unsurprisingly, the protagonists take positions that align with 
their commercial interests. For example, potential developers of 
coal seam gas projects in New South Wales have an incentive to 
put maximum pressure on governments to support coal seam gas 
development in the state.  
The Australian coal seam gas sector has been slow to respond to 
community concerns. In New South Wales the result is a 
stalemate. The economic benefits of development are significant, 
yet the risks of inappropriate or poorly regulated development are 
of great concern to many members of the community. The current 
position is almost certainly unsatisfactory for all players.  
A better response can be found in the recent creation of a Center 
for Sustainable Shale Development in the USA. Significant shale 
gas developers, including Shell and Chevron, have joined with 
environmental groups to create a set of standards for the use of 
hydraulic fracturing in the north-eastern United States. These 
standards will form the basis of the Center’s independent, third-
party certification process. Australian industry could learn from 
this initiative. 
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Through the Standing Council on Energy and Resources – which 
includes all relevant ministers – Australian governments must 
come together with industry and environmentalists to develop 
clear and predictable guidelines for coal seam gas development. 
The Standing Council’s recent endorsement of a national, 
harmonised regulatory framework for coal seam gas is a 
beginning.46 Further steps are needed to resolve the impasse and 
the right balance must be found quickly. 
2.3 Creating efficient market frameworks 
The risk of supply constraints in Australia’s east coast markets is 
real. However, these potential constraints are likely to be resolved 
before they materialise. The solution will be for commercial 
players to deliver more supply. Wholesale participants such as 
gas retailers AGL and Energy Australia will have to obtain supply, 
while industrial customers will either negotiate at higher prices or 
seek alternative fuels. The negotiations may prove difficult, and 
may come with heavy price tags in the short term. But these 
problems are for industry, not government, to resolve.  
By contrast, market failures or barriers to the efficient supply-side 
response are appropriate areas for government action. The 
following actions will not directly reduce prices or guarantee 
supply. But they will improve transparency and liquidity and lead 
to a more mature and robust gas market. 
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2.3.1 Joint marketing arrangements should be tightly 
constrained 
Many gas fields are owned by several companies, who form a 
consortium to develop a gas field. This structure can be effective. 
Project partners may invest together because they have 
complementary skills, because a project is too large for one 
company to undertake independently, or as a way of improve risk-
sharing along the supply chain. An example of the last would be 
when an end user of gas, who is not a development specialist, 
takes an equity stake in a project to hedge their gas costs.  
Joint venture arrangements, by themselves, do not pose a 
problem for gas market efficiency. Joint ventures are able to sell 
gas as a single entity, but are subject to constraints under the 
Trade Practices Act. However, in some cases the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has permitted 
gas field consortia to jointly market and sell the output of gas 
fields even where there is no joint venture arrangement in place – 
an arrangement known as joint marketing. Joint marketing is 
usually justified on the ground that reduced risks and shared 
marketing costs lead to lower costs that are then passed on to 
customers. 
Yet joint marketing reduces competition within the upstream gas 
sector by reducing the number of sellers in the market. Gas 
customers have argued that because there are usually only a 
small number of gas fields supplying any market, removing joint 
marketing would improve competition. 
As the east coast market has matured, becoming an 
interconnected market with multiple suppliers from several 
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primary fields, both the arguments for and concerns about joint 
marketing have fallen away. In Western Australia, however, the 
evolution has been slower. The ACCC has authorised joint 
marketing by gas developments including the Gorgon Project. In 
its 2009 decision, however, the Commission only gave 
authorisation until 2015, recognising that the market may be 
beginning to exhibit greater diversity and potential for 
competitiveness. As markets continue to grow in depth and 
breadth, the ACCC should be increasingly sceptical of the 
justification for ongoing joint marketing arrangements, with a view 
to ultimately removing the practice. 
2.3.2 Governments should encourage greater price 
transparency 
The setting of gas prices has historically been dominated by long-
term contracts between gas producers and the wholesale market. 
As the gas market has developed both financially and physically, 
major consumers and producers have recognised the limitations 
of this structure in providing the best result. For example, during a 
period of rapid change, the lack of transparent prices makes it 
difficult for users to assess whether gas prices will rise and, if so, 
by how much. 
In recent years, there has been progress towards short-term 
markets. This includes short-term trading markets operated by the 
Australian Energy Market Operator, the Victorian gas wholesale 
market, the national gas market bulletin board and the proposed 
gas trading hub market in Queensland. The first three are in place 
and the fourth is planned for introduction in 2014. Although it 
could be many years before the Australian gas market is not 
underpinned by long term contracts, these are all good moves. 
Increasing price transparency in the gas market would have 
several benefits. It would help businesses manage the transition 
to higher gas costs by providing more reliable gas price estimates 
for business planning processes. It could also facilitate trading 
between industrial gas customers and gas retailers as it would 
give customers a way to benchmark prices. 
An industry-led proposal to develop a gas price index was initiated 
in 2012 and referenced in the Commonwealth Government’s 
Energy White Paper47 but is currently on hold. The delay has 
been attributed to global concerns regarding the development and 
use of price indices. In a recent United Kingdom case, bankers 
were found to have manipulated the London Inter-bank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR), an interest rate index. This has sparked broader 
concerns about the vulnerability of price indices to manipulation. 
An international review of the LIBOR case will be released in the 
second half of 2013. 
If the regulatory challenges can be resolved, and they should be, 
development of a price index would enhance price transparency 
and increase competition. Governments should play a role in 
providing regulatory guidance, bringing together market 
participants or promoting participation in developing a price index 
mechanism. 
2.3.3 Governments should act to eliminate barriers to 
pipeline access  
The ability to transport gas between major markets is limited to 
the capacity of pipelines that connect the markets. Investment in 
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new pipelines is expensive and may not be economically justified 
but it may be possible to use existing infrastructure more 
effectively. Improving access to pipeline capacity would assist to 
improve competition in east coast markets. 
The lack of transparency in gas markets makes the prospect of a 
capacity market attractive. In the current market, there is a 
substantial risk that a party wanting to obtain pipeline capacity 
and a party willing to sell would not find each other. This may 
occur because potential buyers do not know who owns the 
existing capacity or because the effort of contacting capacity 
holders to find a counterparty would be greater than the potential 
reward. A market could help facilitate efficient transactions. 
Further, in the absence of a capacity market, buyers seeking 
pipeline capacity or sellers with spare capacity would generally 
buy or sell to the owner of the pipeline. This occurs because 
buyers and sellers have limited information on which other market 
participants want to trade. Because of the high cost for buyers 
and sellers to find each other, the pipeline owner has little 
incentive to offer competitive prices to buy or sell capacity. By 
offering an alternative mechanism to buy or sell, a market could 
lower the price of pipeline capacity.  
By allowing for short-term capacity trading, it is also hoped that 
new sellers will enter into regional gas markets. For example, a 
gas producer may have some spare gas processing capacity for a 
short period. The difficulty of getting the gas to market may mean 
that capacity is not used. If the producer had ready access to 
reasonably priced pipeline capacity, it may elect to transport gas 
to a regional gas market to sell. By increasing the number of 
sellers, it is hoped that capacity markets would increase 
competition and lower gas prices. 
The Australian Energy Market Operator is considering the 
development of two capacity trading products: a monthly forward 
product and a bulletin board style capacity exchange. These 
products are aimed at overcoming barriers between capacity 
owners and potential buyers at the Wallumbilla gas hub. The 
Wallumbilla trading hub is planned for introduction in early 2014, 
coinciding with the beginning of LNG exports. 
While current proposals for a capacity trading market have 
centred on Wallumbilla,48 the concept could be applied to other 
pipelines and could be regarded as a way to improve competition 
in other regions. In May 2013, the Standing Council on Energy 
and Resources released a consultation paper on the trade in 
natural gas transmission pipeline capacity.49 This process will 
examine ways that unused pipeline capacity may be traded. 
Accelerating development of this reform is warranted to take 
account of the pressing need for market flexibility over the years 
immediately following the commencement of LNG exports. 
Regulatory agencies, governments and industry groups have 
contemplated some of these reforms. But they are not happening 
fast enough. In the next four years, east coast gas demand is set 
to increase fourfold. The markets must mature as they grow. 
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2.4 Share the benefits 
Australian gas, as a natural resource, is owned by the Australian 
people. It is therefore appropriate that as LNG exports begin to 
expand rapidly, Australian governments should ensure that 
Australians are being appropriately compensated for the sale of 
these assets. 
For the purpose of this report, tax and royalty arrangements for 
the natural gas industry were not reviewed. However, the 
argument that Australians have more to gain from trading LNG 
than they have to lose from higher prices assumes that 
appropriate tax and transfer systems are in place. Governments 
should ensure that this is the case. 
Protectionist policies impose an implicit tax on gas producers by 
forcing them to sell gas at prices lower than those they could 
achieve in an unconstrained market. An explicit tax regime is a 
more efficient means of collecting revenue. It also allows more 
flexibility for governments to decide how to spend that revenue, 
whereas protectionist policies confer all of the benefits on gas 
users. 
2.5 Challenges for industry 
2.5.1 Gas Producers: ensuring supply 
There are two reasons that a potential supply issue could arise in 
the gas market, even though there is no shortage of gas in the 
ground. First, there could be a problem if the market experienced 
a ‘market failure’ or if barriers impeded the efficient response of 
the supply side to increased demand. This is an issue for 
governments to address. Second, supply infrastructure may be 
physically unable to meet growing demand in the short term, 
leading to a squeeze on supply and higher prices. To ensure this 
latter issue does not arise, industry must quickly and visibly 
respond to potential infrastructure limitations.  
If supply constraints push up prices for residential and small 
business consumers, governments will be pressured to act in 
counter-productive ways – by re-introducing retail price controls, 
for example. Therefore, it is in the self-interest of industry to 
demonstrate to government that it can solve the supply problem. 
There have been signs of such a response in announcements by 
Santos and Origin that specific tranches of contracted gas will be 
allocated to meet domestic demand.50 
2.5.2 Gas users: adapting to higher prices 
Affected industries can mitigate the impact of higher gas prices in 
a number of ways. They can switch to other fuel sources, pass 
costs on to customers or shift operations to other locations - in 
some cases, possibly outside Australia. 
The managing director of Brickworks has noted that higher gas 
prices have prompted the company to use sawdust to fire a kiln in 
Tasmania and “methane from landfill operations at several sites 
on the mainland”.51 Such adaptations can mitigate the impacts of 
higher gas costs. 
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Figure 10: Total use value for industries sensitive to high gas 
prices: Australian production vs imports, 2008-09 
 
Source:  ABS (2010) 
In some cases, it is not firms but the end users of a product that 
will ultimately bear the cost of higher gas prices. This will occur 
when most of the product consumed in Australia is produced 
domestically. In this case, producers are able to raise prices to 
cover higher input costs without losing sales to imported products. 
Figure 10 shows the total trade exposure for three industries 
where gas comprises over 5 per cent of total input costs. In each 
case, most domestic demand is supplied by domestic production, 
suggesting that producers will be able to raise prices to help 
absorb the impact of higher gas costs. 
The following two chapters examine the gas industries on the east 
and west coasts, and how governments and industry should 
respond to the different challenges they present. 
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3. Gas on the east coast
3.1 A shifting market  
For decades, eastern Australian gas markets have been relatively 
stable. Deals to buy and sell gas have mostly been negotiated 
through contracts lasting up to 20 years. These contracts have 
underwritten the development of large gas reserves. Major 
industries have benefitted from being able to secure gas supplies 
to align with their long-term investments. 
However, the beginning of east coast gas exports from 2014 is set 
to create higher and more volatile prices. New sources of gas are 
coming online and existing long-term contracts are expiring. Both 
government and the gas industry have roles to play in guiding the 
market through this period of transition. 
3.2 Coal seam gas 
As in the USA, Australia’s east coast gas reserves have greatly 
increased due to the new capacity to extract unconventional gas 
(see Box 2 for a description of unconventional gas). While the 
main type of unconventional gas in the USA is shale gas, 
unconventional gas production on Australia’s east coast is 
currently dominated by coal seam gas.  
‘Proven and probable’ gas reserves more than tripled between 
2005 and 2012 due to the discovery of more coal seam gas 
reserves, as Figure 12 shows.52 Coal seam gas has grown from a  
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Figure 11: Major pipelines and gas fields in eastern Australia 
Source: Grattan Institute 
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small share of total gas reserves a decade ago to 85 per cent of 
east coast reserves in 2012. Based on current reserves and 
consumption levels, current eastern Australian gas reserves will 
last for nearly 70 years (see Table 1).53  
Figure 12: ‘Proven and probable’ gas reserves in eastern Australia, 
2006 to 2031 
 
Source: AER (2006); AER (2007); AER (2008); AER (2009); AER (2010); AER (2011); AER 
(2012); AEMO (2012a) 
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The development of the coal seam gas industry has provoked 
concerns that water extracted from coal seams could pollute local 
water supplies, or that fracking (see Box 2) could pollute 
groundwater. Land-owners have objected to coal seam gas 
producers developing gas wells and access roads on privately 
owned land. In February 2013, these objections led the New 
South Wales Government to impose tighter restrictions on the 
industry and instigating a review into the state’s coal seam gas 
activity.54 
Restrictions on coal seam gas development in New South Wales 
are unlikely to materially affect the supply of gas for export 
projects. Of Australia’s extensive coal seam gas reserves, around 
93 per cent are held in Queensland. They underpin the 
development of LNG export projects. All the same, about 
2900 petajoules of coal seam gas is available in New South 
Wales. If developed, this would make a material difference to New 
South Wales supply security and would be one way of alleviating 
potential supply constraints from other sources as described later 
in this chapter.   
3.3 The export market 
The east coast of Australia has vast reserves of gas, existing 
pipeline infrastructure and a relatively small level of domestic gas 
demand. These features make gas exports attractive.  
Gas exports are forecast to occur for the first time on the east 
coast from late-2014 and are expected to have a dramatic effect 
on the market. Between 2013 and 2017, east coast gas demand 
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is forecast to increase fourfold: from about 700 to 2800 petajoules 
a year. 
Figure 13 provides the Australian Energy Market Operator’s most 
recent forecast for east coast gas demand over the next two 
decades. The scale of LNG development is immense. The five 
LNG trains that are under construction in Queensland are forecast 
to require $50 billion of capital expenditure. A further three trains 
are forecast to be developed before 2018. 
Figure 13: Forecast gas demand for eastern Australia 
 
Source: AEMO (2012a) 
Four main groups are developing LNG terminals:   
• Queensland Curtis LNG is owned by QGC, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the UK oil and gas company, BG Group.55 
QCLNG has committed to developing two LNG trains, which 
will start exporting gas in 2014. 
• Australia Pacific LNG is a joint venture between Australia’s 
Origin Energy (37.5 per cent), ConocoPhillips from the USA 
(37.5 per cent) and China’s Sinopec (25 per cent).56 APLNG is 
developing one LNG train, which will commence exports in 
2015, and is expected to develop a second train by 2016. 
• Gladstone LNG is a joint venture between Australian gas 
producer, Santos (30 per cent), Malaysia’s Petronas (27.5 per 
cent), French firm Total (27.5 per cent) and Korean KOGAS 
(15 per cent).57 GLNG is developing two LNG trains, which will 
start exporting gas in 2015. 
• Arrow LNG is a joint venture between Dutch firm Shell and 
Chinese firm PetroChina.58 The two firms own equal shares in 
the project. Arrow LNG has proposed to develop two LNG 
trains but has not committed to the projects. It has been 
suggested that if domestic gas prices rise, Arrow LNG may 
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forego developing LNG trains to sell gas to other LNG projects 
or gas users.59 
3.4 Pressure points 
Projects being developed on the east coast are the world’s first 
LNG projects to depend on coal seam gas as the source of 
supply. While conventional gas may be extracted from a single 
well, coal seam gas is produced from thousands of much smaller 
wells over wide areas. Each well may have its own production 
challenges. This makes it harder for producers to predict output 
from a coal seam gas field, relative to a conventional field. 
The consequences of delays in production to supply LNG exports 
could be severe. If coal seam gas wells do not deliver as much 
gas as planned, LNG projects may seek to source extra gas from 
the domestic market. This could put further pressure on domestic 
gas prices, on top of the price pressure from linking to global 
markets and higher production costs. 
Figure 14 illustrates gas flows in eastern Australia on 8 June 2011 
– that year’s peak day for aggregate gas demand. This analysis 
illustrates the challenge for the east coast market in coming years. 
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Figure 14: Gas flow in eastern Australia on 8 June 2011 (terajoules) 
 
Source: National Gas Market Bulletin Board (2013) and Grattan Analysis 
New South Wales relies more than other markets do on gas 
imports from other states, as Figure 15 shows. It has lower levels 
of gas production capacity than any state except Tasmania. 
Instead, it imports gas from other states via pipelines. The 
approach has worked so far, yet the lack of local production 
leaves New South Wales more exposed than other states in the 
event of an east coast supply constraint. 
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Figure 15: Daily capacity of gas infrastructure by state, 2012 
 
Source: Core Energy Group (2012) 
3.4.1 Potential constraints in New South Wales 
To illustrate how gas markets on Australia’s east coast could 
become constrained, Figure 16 shows possible gas flows on a 
peak gas day in 2016. 
We have assumed that no new coal seam gas fields or new 
processing capacity have been developed, and that the flow 
direction for the pipeline linking the Cooper Basin to Queensland 
has reversed: rather than sending gas to southern markets, gas 
exporters are now sending it north to supply Queensland LNG 
facilities. 
Figure 16: Possible gas flow on a peak gas day in 2016 (terajoules) 
 
 
Note: Supply to New South Wales is constrained by processing capacity at Cooper, which 
is assumed to be 390 terajoules a day. Supply from the Victorian storage facility 
may be lower if operators can anticipate demand and increase the flow of gas 
from the Otway Basin. Export demand is based on the average daily requirement 
to supply 1,766 petajoules of export demand for 2016, as per AEMO’s planning 
case forecast. It is assumed that export demand is supplied from additional gas 
fields (not shown). 
Source: National Gas Market Bulletin Board (2013) and Grattan Analysis 
On this hypothetical day, New South Wales experiences a supply 
shortfall of around 150 terajoules, over one sixth of its forecast 
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daily demand. This is the result of constraints on gas processing 
capacity at the Cooper Basin now that over half of the gas being 
produced there is flowing into Queensland. 
3.4.2 Getting gas to New South Wales 
The analysis presented in Figure 16 does not imply that gas 
supplies will necessarily fall short in New South Wales – only that 
a shortfall is a real possibility if action is not taken. There are a 
number of solutions that could be implemented before the issue 
becomes severe. Supply constraints are only likely to emerge on 
days when demand for gas is high, so solutions that do not 
involve major expansions or expenditure are particularly 
attractive. 
Coal seam gas developments 
As Section 2.2 sets out, governments, industry and community 
groups need to resolve the impasse on coal seam gas 
development in New South Wales. If coal seam gas can be 
developed, it could produce more than enough gas to meet the 
additional gas demand in New South Wales on a peak day.  
If it is determined that coal seam gas development poses 
unacceptable risks or cannot win community acceptance, then 
alternatives are available. However, companies may be unwilling 
to invest in other solutions if they believe that approval of coal 
seam gas developments is imminent. The Commonwealth and 
New South Wales governments need to provide clarity and 
certainty to industry. 
Getting gas from the Cooper Basin 
Figure 16 also shows how the Cooper Basin reached the limit on 
the amount of gas it can produce on our hypothetical peak day. At 
present, processing capacity is around 390 terajoules of gas a 
day. Figure 14 shows that this capacity, supplemented with gas 
flowing from Queensland, was enough to supply South Australia 
and New South Wales on the busiest day in 2011. Yet by 2016 
Queensland is forecast to require imports from the Cooper Basin, 
rather than being predominantly a source of supply. 
Companies are already working to address this issue. In May, 
Santos, a gas producer with a large stake in the Gladstone LNG 
export project, announced that it would expand production 
capacity at the Cooper Basin to 550 terajoules per day by 2015,60 
an increase of 140 terajoules. This is a substantial increase in 
capacity and will assist in managing demand in New South Wales. 
Increasing production in Queensland 
The analysis in Figure 16 assumes that capacity on the pipeline 
flowing from the Cooper Basin to Queensland is fully utilised. This 
includes the 85 terajoules of capacity now available, plus an extra 
142 terajoules forecast to be available from 2015. 
Alternatively, if more gas can be supplied from coal seam gas 
fields in Queensland it may be possible to reduce the amount of 
gas flowing from the Cooper Basin. This can only occur if 
producers in Queensland have enough resources to develop 
more gas fields, recognising the extensive developments already 
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underway in Queensland to supply gas for exports. It would also 
require higher gas prices in New South Wales as a commercial 
incentive for gas producers to divert the gas, and to underpin 
higher development costs in Queensland.  
Increasing pipeline capacity from Victoria 
More gas could be supplied to New South Wales by increasing 
the capacity of pipelines flowing from Victoria. The Eastern Gas 
Pipeline is almost 800 kilometres long and can carry 
288 terajoules a day.61 Expanding this pipeline would increase 
this capacity. Yet it is unclear whether an expansion could deliver 
gas to New South Wales in time to assist with potential supply 
constraints, or if remaining gas reserves in the Gippsland Basin 
would justify investment in gas transmission infrastructure. 
An alternative is to expand the capacity of the New South 
Wales-Victorian Interconnector, a pipeline that connects the 
Victorian Gas Transmission Network to the New South Wales gas 
network. The interconnector can currently supply up to 
44 terajoules of gas a day to New South Wales on a peak day. 
APA Group, the gas transportation business that owns the 
pipeline, has proposed to expand this capacity. While an 
expansion of the interconnector would not independently resolve 
a large supply shortfall in New South Wales, it may assist in 
managing demand at the margin. The expansion project is 
expected to be completed in 2014.62 
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Gas storage 
In Victoria, a gas storage facility in Dandenong stores gas as 
LNG. It can be filled on days when gas demand is low and used to 
augment gas supplies on days when demand is high. Gas retailer 
AGL is developing a similar facility in Newcastle. Due to open in 
2015, it will be able to supply up to 120 terajoules a day to the 
New South Wales market. 
Reducing demand 
In the absence of new supply, the New South Wales gas market 
will revert to the default mechanism for balancing supply and 
demand: higher prices. If gas shortages emerge, prices will rise 
and demand can be expected to fall. That will cause gas-fired 
generators to run less often, particularly if other power generators 
are available to meet the state’s electricity requirements. If prices 
rise further, commercial gas users may reduce gas use, switch to 
alternative fuels, or even close down operations. 
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4. The West Australian gas market 
4.1 A very different market 
Western Australia has huge reserves: around 90,000 petajoules, 
or 64 per cent of the ‘proven and probable’ gas reserves in 
Australia.63 Most of them are conventional gas fields, located in 
deep water off the coast of northern Western Australia. The fields 
are very large, but more expensive to reach than conventional 
onshore or shallow-water gas fields. Developing them requires 
significant scale: in many cases they are viable with contracts in 
the export market but not to meet domestic demand alone.   
Western Australia started exporting gas in 1989 from the North 
West Shelf project in the Carnarvon Basin.64 This project alone 
produces about six per cent of all global LNG exports.65 The 
Western Australian gas market is physically separate to the east 
coast market. It confronts different challenges. It has fewer buyers 
and sellers, large distances between major gas fields and demand 
centres, and fewer major transmission pipelines.  
The recent surge in global demand for gas has led to massive 
new investment in LNG projects in Western Australia. Projects 
worth at least $116 billion are underway and more are in the 
advanced planning stage. Western Australia’s gas exports will 
increase by close to 70 per cent by 2017, as Figure 18 shows.
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Figure 17: Major pipelines and gas fields in Western Australia 
Source: Grattan Institute 
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Figure 18: Forecast gas demand for Western Australia, 2010 to 2031 
 
Soures: ACIL Tasman (2011); Government of Western Australia (2012a) 
4.2 Recent concerns about price and supply 
When the North West Shelf project began exporting gas in 1989, 
domestic gas prices did not increase immediately. In part, this 
reflected much lower prices in major export markets. Japanese 
prices were around $5 a gigajoule, compared with around $16 a 
gigajoule today.66 But prices were also shaped by a major deal in 
which the State Government committed to buy a large volume of 
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gas from the North West Shelf project.67 The deal made the 
project possible and enabled a major expansion in Western 
Australia’s gas market. But the contracted volumes were very 
generous, exceeding local demand.68 This helped to keep prices 
low, compared with export prices, as shown in Figure 19. 
Since the mid-2000s the domestic market has been under strain. 
Western Australia’s minerals boom has driven growth in demand, 
gas production costs have increased due to higher input costs 
and some fields have been depleted. Moreover, in the coming 
years the North West Shelf project will complete its original 
obligation to supply gas to the domestic market. Without new 
domestic contracts it could supply no gas to the domestic market 
after about 2020.69 Prices have risen sharply, from an average 
$2 to $3 a gigajoule to new contracts at around $8 to $9 a 
gigajoule. Some short-term deals have been reported as high as 
$15 a gigajoule.70  
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Figure 19: Blended average* Western Australia wellhead gas prices 
and Japan LNG import price from Western Australia, 1980 to 2012 
 
Notes: * Blended average combines operating gas contracts, some of which were set when 
prices were substantially lower. Japan prices shown are for landed gas and 
include transport and liquefaction costs. Historical data for these costs is not 
readily available. Currently they run at about $5 per gigajoule, but they would 
have been substantially lower in the past. 
Source: OECD (2013); Government of Western Australia (2012b); RBA (2013) 
The domestic market needs to bring on new sources of supply. 
Western Australia has plenty of gas, but some gas users have 
raised concerns that LNG producers will put foreign buyers first, 
and fail to meet the needs or timing of smaller local customers. 
To help address this, the Western Australian State Government 
has intervened in the market. In 2003, the Government imposed a 
requirement on the large Gorgon project to supply 2,000 
petajoules of gas to the domestic market over the life of the 
project. In 2006, the Government formalised a policy to reserve 
gas for domestic use. Under the policy, the Government 
negotiates for 15 per cent of output from LNG projects to be 
reserved for sale in the domestic gas market.71 
4.3 Reserving gas is not the answer 
The key problem with the domestic gas reservation policy is that 
government overrides the market and sets the volume of supply. 
This has risks. In particular, government could force too much gas 
into the domestic market. Suppliers will have less flexibility to 
adjust how much gas they supply, and will be forced to compete 
with one another to sell this gas into the market. This will push 
prices down and could restart the cycle of poor outcomes that 
followed the deal with the North West Shelf project. 
As the following section describes, years of low prices 
discouraged producers from developing new gas fields, leading to 
little competition and supply constraints. 
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4.3.1 How oversupply eventually led to high prices 
The Western Australian economy became very gas intensive as a 
result of the North West Shelf deal (Figure 20). With ample supply 
and low prices, gas consumption rose fivefold from around 35 to 
150 petajoules each year in the decade after the early 1980s. The 
State Government paid for the gas whether it was consumed or 
not. It was effectively a transfer from state taxpayers to industrial 
gas consumers. 
Figure 20: Gas consumed per dollar of state product 
 
Source: BREE (2012a) 
Eventually the surplus gas led to the development of more gas-
fired power generation.72 Yet low prices also helped to limit 
competition in the gas market to just a few suppliers. During the 
1990s, the North West Shelf project supplied most domestic gas, 
with the balance coming from a small number of alternative 
producers, as Figure 21 shows.  
Figure 21: Western Australia domestic gas production 
 
Source: APPEA production statistics, reproduced in SKM (2011) 
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During the late-1990s and 2000s, there was very little investment 
in domestic gas processing capacity in the Western Australian 
market, as Figure 22 shows. Ample supply and low prices 
discouraged gas producers from developing new infrastructure. 
Lack of investment in new gas supply capacity was not a problem 
while existing capacity could adequately supply the market. But in 
the last decade several factors combined to increase demand and 
decrease supply. The gap between gas consumption and capacity 
to supply shrank to nothing and new contract prices jumped 
sharply (Figure 22). 
From the mid-2000s, Western Australia’s minerals boom 
accelerated growth in domestic demand for gas. An expansion 
project increased the capacity of the Dampier to Bunbury pipeline, 
which also enabled large industrial customers to take more gas.73 
At the same time, competition among suppliers shrank. Several of 
the smaller gas fields in the Perth and Carnarvon Basins were 
depleted.74 As a result, two-thirds of Western Australia’s domestic 
gas supply came from the North West Shelf project between 2009 
and 2012. Close to a third came from Varanus Island, a separate 
gas processing facility in the Carnarvon Basin.  
In 2011, a Western Australian parliamentary inquiry into higher 
gas prices found that a lack of gas processing capacity had been 
a major factor.75 The Inquiry also highlighted that companies were 
struggling to agree on terms for new contracts. The state has an 
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 The pipeline’s owners had been in financial difficulty over about 2000-05, and 
the pipeline was not expanded during that period. Economics and Industry 
Standing Committee (2011) p36. 
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abundance of gas, but the market is in transition, and the difficulty 
reflects different expectations of price, volume and contract 
length. 
Figure 22: Western Australia domestic gas processing capacity, 
consumption and prices 
 
Note: Prices spiked when the NWS came online in 1984. This may reflect uncertainty 
about the marginal cost of production before the project was completed. 
Source: APPEA (2010); BREE (2012a); Government of Western Australia (2012b); SKM 
(2011) 
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4.3.2 Oversupply could happen again 
The market did respond to higher prices, however. New 
processing capacity has come online at Devil Creek this year and 
a similar-sized facility is well advanced at Macedon.76 The North 
West Shelf is also investing, having committed $5 billion to 
recover low-pressure gas from fields in the Carnarvon Basin.77 All 
are intended for the domestic market, and all were committed to in 
2008-10, after prices rose. A conservative estimate puts domestic 
gas supply investments since 2008 at $7.5 billion.78 
Several new LNG facilities will start producing gas in the next few 
years with scope to supply domestic customers. Given the right 
price, there is no reason to expect they would not do so. However, 
if the Government strictly applies the domestic gas reservation 
policy they will have little choice. What happens next depends on 
how the policy is enforced.  
In 2012, the Government’s Strategic Energy Initiative confirmed 
its commitment to reserving gas for the domestic market and 
tightened the policy’s requirements.79 So far the Government has 
negotiated domestic agreements under the reservation with the 
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 Although the gas fields they will draw on are small compared with some LNG 
projects, they are still expected to deliver about 400 terajoules a day at full 
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77
 North Rankin redevelopment project. Woodside (2013) 
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 Devil Creek, Macedon and North Rankin. Does not include the North West 
Shelf’s Greater Western Flank project (which may export), or the Gorgon, 
Wheatstone or Buru projects (will/may operate under the gas reservation policy).  
79
 The updated policy requires a firm 15% of output over the life of the project, as 
distinct from ‘up to 15%’, the wording in the 2006 policy. Added to this, domestic 
supply must commence at the same time as LNG exports. Government of 
Western Australia (2012c) 
Pluto and Wheatstone LNG projects, both of which will supply 
200 terajoules a day. The Gorgon LNG project is due to start 
supplying the domestic market with 150 terajoules a day in about 
2015.80 
Figure 23 illustrates the case where all LNG projects currently 
under development build new processing facilities sufficient to 
deliver 15 per cent of their output to domestic users. In this case 
the market would rapidly return to surplus capacity. The 
Government has implied that this would not occur, saying that it 
will apply the gas reservation policy flexibly, to manage supply 
and individual project circumstances.81 But getting the right 
balance between supply and demand will be difficult, and will 
always be so for any government. This is especially the case 
when government has a strong incentive to keep prices low. The 
problem is best left for markets to solve. 
4.4 What should government do next? 
While Western Australia has significant differences to the eastern 
states, the same principles apply. The Government should seek to 
develop and support efficient gas market frameworks.  
                                            
80
 The Gorgon project has its own legislation that requires domestic supply. The 
Pluto and Wheatstone agreements have been claimed as successes for the 
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Figure 23 Western Australia actual and projected domestic gas 
consumption and gas processing capacity 
 
Notes: Projected domestic gas consumption is the ‘High gas supply’ scenario in 
ACILTasman’s modelling for the Western Australian Government (reference 
below). Projected processing capacity assumes the following LNG projects add 
capacity for 15 per cent of expected output: Macedon (2014), Spar (2016), Icthys 
(2016), Gorgon (2016), Wheatstone (2016), Devil Creek expansion (2017), Pluto 
(2018), Gorgon 2 (2021) and Browse (2021). Perth Basin fields Beharra Spings, 
Dongarra-Mondarra and Woodada decline to zero by 2015. Does not include 
North Rankin or Buru Energy projects.  
Source: APPEA (2010); BREE (2012a); Government of Western Australia (2012b); SKM 
(2011); ACIL Tasman (2011) 
4.4.1 Let the market operate 
The Western Australian Government should end the gas 
reservation policy and allow the market to balance supply and 
demand. Forcing producers to commit to the domestic market 
could repeat history.  
Too much supply would again push gas prices down. This might 
seem attractive, but artificially low prices are bad for the gas 
market. Artificially low prices limit competition between producers 
and suppress incentives to develop alternative sources of supply. 
In the longer-term the market would bring on new supply, but as 
recent experience has shown, prices would have to rise sharply. 
Shortages are possible.  
Artificially low prices are also bad for the economy. Supporting 
businesses through low-priced gas might seem attractive. But it is 
effectively a subsidy for gas users, paid for by gas producers. 
Some of those users will struggle to compete when gas prices 
rise. The Western Australian economy would be better off 
developing industries that are highly competitive.  
LNG exporters should still 'pay their dues' for access to Australia's 
natural resources. Governments should ensure that a portion of 
the benefits from gas exports is shared across the community. 
Reserving gas is poor tool for this, because there is little scope to 
target those most in need. Instead, the Commonwealth and 
Western Australian Governments should ensure that there is an 
efficient tax regime in place for the gas industry, and that the 
gains are distributed appropriately. 
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Choosing to end the reservation policy will involve some pain. 
Gas will go to its highest-value use and, in the short-term, prices 
will rise to ‘export parity’ levels. Gas users will need to adjust, by 
being more efficient, switching fuels or passing on some costs. 
Some businesses may not stay in the state. But in the longer-term 
the market will have sustainable prices, more competition and 
greater security of supply. 
4.4.2 Review joint marketing arrangements 
Joint marketing reduces competition in the upstream gas sector 
by reducing the number of sellers in the market. In 2009 and 2010 
the ACCC authorised joint marketing arrangements for the 
Gorgon and North West Shelf projects until 2015. It argued that 
temporarily allowing joint marketing would help to relieve pressure 
on domestic gas supplies by bringing more gas into the domestic 
market and avoiding delays in the Gorgon development.82  
Over the coming years several new projects will come online. This 
will increase competition and relieve some or all of the supply 
constraints on which the joint marketing authorisations were 
based. If this happens, the ACCC should move toward eliminating 
joint marketing arrangements.83 Doing so would increase 
competition further still, a good thing for a maturing market. The 
fact that smaller projects in Western Australia have been able to 
market their gas separately suggests that joint marketing is not 
essential for larger gas producers.  
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 Joint-marketing authorisation might be retained for companies with a very 
small stake in a joint venture. 
4.4.3 Consider a capacity market for pipeline access  
Increasing access to pipeline capacity could improve competition. 
The Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline ships about 90 per 
cent of state’s gas at some point between production and use.84 
But there is no transparent mechanism to support competitive 
short-term access to pipeline capacity. The pipeline is fully 
contracted to at least 2019, and the owner expands capacity only 
when it has long-term contracts for new supply.85 This constrains 
short-term supply that could deliver more gas onto the market.  
The Western Australian Government recognised the problem in 
the Strategic Energy Initiative 2031 but only committed to 
“encouraging the owners of major gas pipelines to consider 
options for increasing the practical capacity of their infrastructure 
through offering more flexible access contracts.”86 The 
Government could go further and facilitate the development of a 
platform for trading pipeline capacity. 
Pipeline capacity trading could help potential buyers and sellers to 
find each other and negotiate a price. This would assist in making 
the capacity market more competitive. Such a mechanism could 
take a form similar to the capacity market being developed by the 
Australian Energy Market Operator on the east coast.  
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5. Carbon emissions and gas-fired power generation
About a third of the gas consumed in the Australian economy is 
used to generate electricity. Once converted to electricity, gas-
fired generation supplies about 19 per cent of our power.87 The 
rest is generated from black coal (46 per cent), brown coal (22 per 
cent), renewable energy (10 per cent) and oil and other fuels 
(2 per cent). 
In 2010 the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics predicted that gas-fired generation was about to 
increase rapidly.88 The growth would be driven by several factors: 
cheap gas, a carbon price that would make coal generation more 
expensive than gas, and increased demand for electricity due to 
population growth and higher levels of energy consumption. 
Figure 24 explains why gas would have been favoured to meet 
new demand, even with a relatively modest carbon price. It shows 
the cost of electricity that new fossil-fuel power plants would 
require at different carbon prices.  
Unlike renewable energy sources such as solar and wind, gas-
fired power stations produce carbon emissions. Yet for each unit 
of electricity produced, a new gas-fired power station will produce 
about half the emissions of a black coal power plant and a third of 
those of a brown coal power station. 
                                            
87
 BREE (2012a) 
88
 Syed, et al. (2010) 
Figure 24: Required electricity price to justify new fossil fuel power 
plant construction, at various carbon prices 
 
Source: Grattan Analysis  
Despite these advantages, the ‘dash for gas’ isn’t happening. 
There are three reasons why. Electricity demand has been falling, 
rather than growing. Second, since about 2008, legislation to 
support renewable energy is forcing additional renewable energy 
into this shrinking market. Third, higher gas prices rule out 
switching from existing coal to existing gas power stations. 
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The change has important implications for policy makers. It has 
particular implications for how we reduce emissions of carbon 
dioxide in coming years, and for managing the longer-term 
process of transforming our power generation infrastructure to use 
less carbon-intensive fuels. 
5.1 Falling demand means no new capacity is needed 
Electricity demand forecasts from as recently as late last decade 
showed steady growth well into the current decade. Yet since 
2008 demand has fallen, as Figure 25 shows. This is due to a 
number of factors, including reduced demand across all sectors 
as higher electricity prices bite, lower manufacturing output, and 
the rapid uptake of solar PV systems, driven by state-based 
support policies. 
Figure 25 also shows the most recent published forecasts for 
electricity demand under a range of scenarios. Data collected 
since these forecasts were published suggest the falling trend is 
continuing and that electricity demand will be at the lower end of 
the forecast range. The prospects for new gas-fired power 
stations look very poor for at least a decade. 
5.2 Gas is not the cheapest option 
Higher gas prices will also result in existing gas-fired generators 
operating less often. Figure 26 illustrates why. With low gas prices 
and a carbon price of at least $30 a tonne of carbon dioxide, 
existing gas fired generators are cheaper to operate than black or 
brown coal-fired generators. However, with high gas prices and 
low carbon prices brown coal provides the cheapest electricity, 
followed by black coal. 
Figure 25: Electricity demand forecasts for eastern Australia, 2006 
to 2017 
 
Source: AEMO (2012b) 
In the wholesale electricity market, output from power plants is 
adjusted continuously to ensure that supply meets demand. 
During periods of high electricity demand, prices rise and power 
stations produce more. The analysis in Figure 26 does not mean 
that the plants with higher costs will cease to operate entirely. 
However, power stations that face higher operating costs are 
likely to run less often. 
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Figure 26: Required electricity price to justify running fossil fuel 
power plants, at various carbon prices 
Source: Grattan analysis 
The ability of black or brown coal power to substitute for gas-fired 
power in most circumstances may be good news for electricity 
customers. It means that higher gas prices are unlikely to 
substantially increase electricity prices. But it is not good news for 
carbon emission levels. 
5.3 Renewable energy is favoured under current policies 
Gas-fired generation has also been affected by the Renewable 
Energy Target, which requires energy retailers to buy more than 
20 per cent of their electricity from renewable energy sources by 
2020. The result of the policy has been rapid deployment of wind-
powered electricity. This has reduced demand for other types of 
generation, including gas-fired power. 
5.4 The future for gas-fired generation is uncertain 
The future of gas-fired generation in Australia is highly uncertain. 
Figure 27 shows a recent forecast for demand for gas-fired 
generation in eastern Australia. The Planning Scenario is based 
on medium economic growth, stable coal prices and the current 
emissions reduction target of 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 
2020. The Slow Change Scenario is based on slower economic 
growth, falling coal prices and an effective collapse in the carbon 
price. 
Future developments could reignite the ‘dash for gas’ in Australia. 
These developments could include a return to electricity demand 
growth, stronger and more secure targets under climate change 
policies, lower gas prices or a major reduction in the Renewable 
Energy Target. In the absence of such changes, the low-
emissions potential of gas will remain unfulfilled in Australia. 
5.5 Global gas demand will be linked to carbon policies 
Globally, fossil fuels are far from finished. Unconventional 
extraction methods have replenished global reserves of oil, gas 
and other fuels that have the potential to produce a large amount 
of carbon emissions. Concerns about “peak oil” – where prices 
rise rapidly as all available oil reserves are depleted - have 
receded and global gas resources could supply current demand 
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for over 200 years.89 These developments may take the world into 
a new phase of abundant fossil fuel supplies.90 
Figure 27: Outlook for gas demand for electricity generation in 
eastern Australia, 2008 to 2032 
 
Source: AEMO (2012a) 
While this is good news for a rapidly developing, energy-hungry 
world, it could be very bad news for global climate change policy. 
Where gas replaces coal-fired power generation, it will lower 
global carbon emissions. Where it replaces nuclear energy, 
                                            
89
 IEA (2012) 
90
 Helm (2013); Carbon Tracker Initiative (2013) 
emissions will increase. Low-cost, gas-fired generation may even 
mean less investment in renewable energy. It is unclear what the 
net result for carbon emissions will be. 
While the Australian ‘dash for gas’ is not occurring, the global 
story is different. In the US, low shale gas prices have triggered a 
shift away from coal and towards gas-fired power generation. This 
has helped to reduce US greenhouse gas emissions.91 
In Japan, nuclear power stations were closed following a 2011 
nuclear disaster. As a result, demand for gas-fired power 
generation has risen, despite higher gas prices. Whether this 
continues will depend on global action towards reducing carbon 
emissions. 
Figure 28 shows the range of forecasts for global gas demand 
developed by the International Energy Agency. The three 
scenarios feature different assumptions about global action to 
address climate change.92 Current international climate 
negotiations aim to limit average global temperature increases to 
two degrees centigrade.93 Under this scenario, global growth in 
gas demand would peak and flatten by about 2030. 
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Figure 28: World natural gas demand under different carbon policy 
scenarios, 1990 to 2035 
 
Source: IEA (2012) 
The role of gas-fired generation in meeting future global energy 
demand will depend on the development of affordable carbon 
capture and storage technology that can be used alongside gas 
fired generators. At present it is unclear whether the technology 
can be implemented in an affordable, reliable manner. If it can, 
gas-fired generation may continue to grow strongly, even in a 
carbon-constrained world. 
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Exajoules per year
Current policies
New policies
450 ppm scenario
Getting gas right: Australia’s energy challenge 
Grattan Institute 2013 45 
6. References 
ABS (2010) 5209.0.55.001 - Australian National Accounts: Input-Output Tables - 
Electronic Publication, Final release 2006-07 tables,  Input Output 
Multipliers, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/5209.0.
55.001Main Features4Final release 2006-07 
tables?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=5209.0.55.001&is
sue=Final release 2006-07 tables&num=&view 
ABS (2011a) 4442.0 - Family Characteristics, Australia, 2009-10 Households, 
families and persons, Selected characteristics, 1997, 2003, 2006–07, 
2009–10 accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/4442.02009-
10?OpenDocument 
ABS (2011b) 6530.0 - Household Expenditure Survey, Australia: Summary of 
Results, 2009-10,  HES 2009–10 Detailed tables, accessed 16 June 
2013, from 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/6530.02009-
10?OpenDocument 
ACCC (2009) Determination: Applications for authorisation lodged by Chevron 
Australia Pty Ltd, Chevron (TAPL) Pty Ltd, Mobil Australia Resources 
Company Pty Ltd and Shell Development (Australia) Pty Ltd in respect 
of the joint marketing and sale of natural gas from the Gorgon Gas 
Project for supply in Western Australia,  C2009/979, Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission 
ACCC (2010) Determination: Applications for authorisation lodged by BHP 
Billiton Petroleum (North West Shelf) Pty Ltd, BP Developments 
Australia Pty Ltd, Chevron Australia Pty Ltd, Japan Australia LNG 
(MIMI) Pty Ltd, Shell Development (Australia) Pty Ltd and Woodside 
Energy Ltd in respect of the joint marketing activities for the sale of 
domgas in Western Australia from the North West Shelf Project and to 
administer existing gas supply contracts,  C2010/344, Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission 
ACIL Tasman (2010) Gas prices in Western Australia,  Review of inputs to the 
WA Wholesale Energy Market, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.imowa.com.au/f2138,484255/484255_ACIL_Tasman_Final_
Report_-_Updated.pdf 
ACIL Tasman (2011) Energy futures for Western Australia - Scenario 
development and modelling outcomes Prepared for the Office of Energy 
ACIL Tasman (2012) Fuel Cost Projections,  Updated natural gas and coal 
outlook for AEMO modelling, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=w
eb&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aemo.com.au
%2FConsultations%2FNational-Electricity-
Market%2FOpen%2F~%2Fmedia%2FFiles%2FOther%2Fplanning%2F
Fuel_cost_projections_Natural_gas_and_coal_outlooks.ashx&ei=6Pum
UZ-
eGYfbkQWEioDgDQ&usg=AFQjCNGR2ah8mGOLHL8XJmqv9DWsNQ
iZTg&sig2=HjzPSbOztzz8HKqfIGMtPg 
AEMO (2011) Gas Statement of Opportunities, Australian Energy Market 
Operator 
AEMO (2012a) Gas Statement of Opportunities, Australian Energy Market 
Operator 
AEMO (2012b) National Electricity Forecasting Report, Australian Energy Market 
Operator 
AEMO (2012c) Victorian Gas System Adequacy, Australian Energy Market 
Operator 
AEMO (2013) 'Development Work', accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.aemo.com.au/Gas/Market-Operations/Gas-Supply-
Hub/Development-Work 
AER (2006) State of the Energy Market, Australian Energy Regulator 
AER (2007) State of the Energy Market, Australian Energy Regulator 
AER (2008) State of the Energy Market, Australian Energy Regulator 
AER (2009) State of the Energy Market, Australian Energy Regulator 
AER (2010) State of the Energy Market, Australian Energy Regulator 
AER (2011) State of the Energy Market, Australian Energy Regulator 
AER (2012) State of the Energy Market, Australian Energy Regulator 
AIG (2013a) AIG Energy Stakeholder Survey,  
AIG (2013b) 'Manufacturing malaise continues', accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.aigroup.com.au/industrynewsletter - Box1 
APLNG (2013) 'Project partners', accessed April 2013, from 
http://www.aplng.com.au/about-project/project-partners 
Getting gas right: Australia’s energy challenge 
Grattan Institute 2013 46 
APPEA (2010) Economics and Industry Standing Committee Inquiry into 
Domestic Gas Prices - Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration 
Association, Parliament of Western Australia 
Arrow Energy (2013) 'Our Company,' accessed April 2013, from 
http://www.arrowenergy.com.au/our-company 
Australian Council of Learned Academies (2013) Engineering Energy: 
Unconventional gas production,  A study of shale gas in Australia 
Baulderstone, J. (2013) Natural Gas: A balanced energy solution for NSW, 
Santos, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.santos.com/library/130410_A_balanced_energy_solution_fo
r_NSW.pdf 
Bethune, G. (2013) Australia’s golden age of gas dawns, accessed 16 June 
2013, from 
http://www.energyquest.com.au/uploads/docs/0607_bethune.pdf 
BREE (2012a) Australian energy statistics data, Bureau of Resources and 
Energy Economics 
BREE (2012b) Australian Energy Technology Assessment, accessed 16 June 
2013, from 
http://www.bree.gov.au/documents/publications/aeta/Australian_Energy
_Technology_Assessment.pdf 
BREE (2012c) Gas market report, Bureau of Resources and energy economics 
Carbon Tracker Initiative (2013) 'Carbon Tracker', from 
http://www.carbontracker.org/team/contact/about-us 
Chambers, M. (2013a) 'Beach Energy to sell $1.5 bn of natural gas to Origin 
Energy', The Australian, 11 April 2013,  from 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/beach-energy-
to-sell-15bn-of-natural-gas-to-origin-energy/story-e6frg9df-
1226617726329 
Chambers, M. (2013b) 'Santos reserves NSW gas for domestic use', The 
Australian, 10 April 2013,  from 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/santos-
reserves-nsw-gas-for-domestic-use/story-e6frg9df-1226616250393 
Core Energy Group (2012) Review of Gas Facilities: Existing and New, 
Australian Energy Market Operator 
Denniss, R. (2012) The use and abuse of economic modelling in Australia, The 
Australia Institute, accessed 16 June 2012, from 
https://http://www.tai.org.au/index.php?q=node%2F19&pubid=950&act=
display 
Department of Energy and Water Supply (2012) 2012 Gas Market Review: 
Queensland, State of Queensland 
Dicolo, J. A. (2013) 'Natural Gas Blazes a Path to Higher Prices', The Wall Street 
Journal, 5 April 2015, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324373204578374773
681881796.html 
DomGas Alliance (2012) Australia’s Domestic Gas Security, accessed 16 June 
2013, from http://www.domgas.com.au/pdf/Alliance_reports/DomGas 
Report 2012.pdf 
DomGas Alliance (2013) WA Domestic gas market outlook: 2013-2020, from 
http://www.domgas.com.au/pdf/Alliance_reports/WA DOMESTIC GAS 
MARKET OUTLOOK-FINAL-Feb 2013.pdf 
Dow (2012) Australia’s Energy Opportunity: In the National Interest, accessed 16 
June 2013, from http://www.dow.com/advanced-
manufacturing/pdf/australia/Dow_Factsheet_Canada.pdf 
DRET (2012) Energy White Paper, Department of Resources Energy and 
Tourism 
Economics and Industry Standing Committee (2011) Inquiry into Domestic Gas 
Prices Parliament of Western Australia 
EIA (2011) Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States, Energy 
Information Administration, US Deptartment of Energy 
EIA (2012) 'What is shale gas and why is it important?', accessed 16 June 2013, 
from http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/about_shale_gas.cfm 
EIA (2013a) Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An 
Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the 
United States, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ 
EIA (2013b) 'US Natural Gas Citygate Price', accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n3050us3M.htm 
EnergyQuest (2012) Energy Quarterly, August 2012,  
EPA (2013) Inventory of US Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990-2011, 
US Environmental Protection Agency 
Götz, L., Glauben, T. and Brümmer, B. (2013) 'Wheat export restrictions and 
domestic market effects in Russia and Ukraine during the food crisis', 
Food Policy, 38, p 214-226 
Government of Western Australia (2006) WA Government Policy on Securing 
Domestic Gas Supplies, Department of Industry and Resourcesfrom 
130614 Gas report v5.4 w refs.docx 
Getting gas right: Australia’s energy challenge 
Grattan Institute 2013 47 
Government of Western Australia (2012a) Fact Sheet: Western Australia LNG, 
Department of State Developmentfrom 
http://www.dsd.wa.gov.au/documents/fact_Sheet_Western_Australia_L
NG_November_2012.pdf 
Government of Western Australia (2012b) Quantity and value of minerals and 
petroleum, from http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/1521.aspx 
Government of Western Australia (2012c) Strategic Energy Initiative Energy 
2031 - Building the pathways for Western Australia's energy future, 
Department of Finance - Public Utilities Office 
Harrison, A. and Rodriguez-Clare, A. (2010) Foreign Investment and Industrial 
Policy for Developing Countries,  in Handbook of Deveopment 
Economics vol 5, North-Holland 
Helm, D. (2013) The Carbon Crunch How We're Getting Climate Change Wrong 
- and How to Fix It, Yale University Press 
IEA (2012) World Energy Outlook International Energy Agency 
Incitec Pivot (2012) Annual Report 2012, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://investors.incitecpivot.com.au/phoenix.zhtml?c=170340&p=irol-
reportsannual 
John Williams Scientific Services (2012) An analysis of coal seam gas 
production and natural resource management in Australia,  Issues and 
ways forward, accessed 16 June 1013, from 
http://www.wentworthgroup.org/uploads/An analysis of CSG production 
and NRM in Australia Oct 2012 FULL.pdf 
Kehoe, J. (2013) 'Shale gas a trigger for major reform: McKibbin', Australian 
Financial Review,   
King, S. (2013) 'A gas reservation scheme is protectionism in disguise', The 
Conversation, 30 January 2013, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://theconversation.com/a-gas-reservation-scheme-is-protectionism-
in-disguise-11810 
Klinger, P. (2013) 'Gorgon gas sales fall short', The West Australian, 29 May 
2013, accessed 16 June 2016, from 
http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/17368370/gorgon-gas-
sales-fall-short/ 
Liveris, A. (2013) 'Lack of an energy policy will hurt our economy', The 
Australian, 28 May 2013, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/lack-of-an-energy-
policy-will-hurt-our-economy/story-e6frg9if-1226651688339 
Macdonald-Smith, A. (2013) 'Origin and Arrow in talks over LNG project', 
Australian Financial Review, 27 May 2013,   
Manufacturing Australia (2013) 'Manufacturing Australia Welcomes Government 
Gas Market Analysis: All Options Must Be Explored In National 
Interest', accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.manufacturingaustralia.com.au/news/news-
releases/manufacturing-australia-welcomes-government-gas-market-
analysis-all-options-must-be-explored-in-the-national-interest/ 
National Gas Market Bulletin Board (2013) Gas flow data, from 
http://www.gasbb.com.au/viewArchive.aspx?node=archive 
NERA Economic Consulting (2012) Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports 
from the United States, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://energy.gov/fe/services/natural-gas-regulation/lng-export-study 
NIEIR (2012) Large scale export of East Coast Australia natural gas: Unintended 
consequences,  A study of the national interest effects of the structure 
of the Australian gas industry., accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.aigroup.com.au/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanage
ment.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/LIVE_CONTENT/Publications/Rep
orts/2012/Gas_report_FINAL.pdf 
OECD (2013) Dataset: Natural gas import costs by importing country and by 
origin,  Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), Japan from Australia 
PACIA (2013) Adding value: The critical, enabling role of the chemicals and 
plastics industry for Australia’s future, Plastics & Chemicals Industries 
Association 
Philips, M. (2012) 'Is Natural Gas Too Cheap to Drill?', BloombergBusinessweek, 
17 April 2012, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-17/is-natural-gas-too-
cheap-to-drill 
PIRA (2013) Scenario Planning Service Quarterly Update, May 2013, PIRA 
Energy Group 
Productivity Commission (2009) Submission to the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Economics: Inquiry into Raising the Level of 
Productivity Growth in Australia, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/91382/productivity-
growth.pdf 
QGC (2013) 'Who we are', accessed April 2013, from 
http://www.qgc.com.au/who-we-are.aspx 
RBA (2013) Exchange rates - Monthly - Table F11, Reserve Bank of Australia 
Getting gas right: Australia’s energy challenge 
Grattan Institute 2013 48 
ROAM Consulting (2011) Projections of Electricity Generation in Australia to 
2050, accessed 16 June 2013, from 
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/carbonpricemodelling/content/consultants
_reports/ROAM_Projections_of_Electricity_Generation_in_Australia_to
_2050_20110803.pdf 
Roberts, P. (2013) 'Gas crisis looms for manufacturing, says Brickworks', 
Australian Financial Review, 21 January 2013, accessed 16 June 2013, 
from 
http://www.afr.com/p/national/gas_crisis_looms_for_manufacturing_lxn
A82K5smXZcLUIHE4cgJ 
Salinas, G. and Aksoy, A. (2006) Growth before and after trade liberalization,  
World Bank policy research working paper 4062, World Bank 
Santos (2013) 'Project partners', accessed April 2013, from 
http://www.santosglng.com/the-project/partners.aspx 
SCER (2013) Regulation Impact Statement: Gas Transmission Pipeline Capacity 
Trading,  
SKM (2011) WA domestic gas market analysis for the strategic energy initiative,  
SKM report to the Office of Energy 
SKM MMA (2011) Carbon Pricing and Australia’s Electricity Markets, accessed 
16 July 2013, from 
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/carbonpricemodelling/content/consultants
_reports/SKM_MMA_Carbon_pricing_and_Australias_electricity_marke
t_20110804.pdf 
SMH (2013) 'NSW will face gas crisis, says AGL', The Sydney Morning Herald, 
10 April 2013, accessed 16 June 1013, from 
http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/nsw-will-face-gas-crisis-says-agl-
20130410-2hlyv.html 
Spectator, B. (2013) 'US approves LNG export plant', 18 May 2013, accessed 
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/news/2013/5/18/resources-and-
energy/us-approves-lng-export-plant, from 16 June 2013 
Syed, A., Melanie, J., Thorpe, S. and Penney, K. (2010) Australian energy 
projections to 2029-30,  ABARE research report 10.02 prepared for the 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Austalian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The Hon Barry O'Farrell (2013) Tough new rules for coal seam gas activity,  
Premier of NSW Media release - 19 Februrary 2013, State Government 
of New South Wales 
Woodside (2013) 'North Rankin Redevelopment', from 
http://www.woodside.com.au/Our-Business/North-West-
Shelf/Projects/North-Rankin/Pages/default.aspx 
World Bank (2013) World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), from 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPRO
SPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21574907~menuPK:7859231~pagePK:64165
401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html 
 
